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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
language which clearly gives the surviving spouse the powers of disposi-
tion necessary to qualify for this tax saving -technique.
The writer believes that at least as to wills written after the marital
deduction was authorized by Congress, the Ohio courts should take this
fact into consideration and should not blindly follow earlier Ohio deci-
sions construing wills which were written before there was a marital
deduction.
ROBERT N. COOK
INSURANCE
Interpreting Scope of the Policy
A retail merchant obtained liability insurance to protect him against
obligations to pay claims arising out of "the ownership, maintenance or
use" of his business premises. This insured illegally sold B-B shot to a
minor who, using it, injured another. The injured party filed suit against
the insured who, in turn, brought an action for a declaratory judgment
ihat the insurer be required to defend the action. The court held that
the fact that the injury, for which suit is here brought, occurred off the
premises of the insured does not relieve the insurer of his responsibility
to defend.' There was no restriction in the policy as to where the injury
must occur. 'The accident must arise out of the operation of the premises
and it was in the operation of such premises that the alleged unlawful
sale of the B-B shot occurred." The court rejected a second defensive
contention of the insurer that "products liability" insurance, which insured
did not buy, covered the liability -here involved to the exclusion of lia-
bility under the use of premises provisions. However, it was held that
"products liability" insurance was concerned with the situation of breach
of warranties and conditions. But the injury here was unrelated to the
condition of the B-B shot itself.
Brewer v. DeCant2 involved a liability policy in which the insurer
agreed to pay claims "which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay" arising out of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of automobiles in
connection with insured's operation of his automobile dealership. Insured
sold and gave title to an automobile on which a chattel mortgage was
given to the finance company. When the buyer was unable to meet
1. Lessak v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 168 Ohio St. 153, 151
N.E.2d 730 (1958) affirming, 106 Ohio App. 179, 153 N.E.2d 787 (1957).
2. 167 Ohio St. 411, 149 N.E.2d 166 (1958). See also SALES and TORTS sec-
tions, infra.
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the mortgage payments, the finance company repossessed the automobile
and delivered it to insured for resale. Title remained in the defaulting
buyer. DeCant agreed to buy the automobile, took possession, and au-
thorized insured to obtain title for him. Within twenty-four hours De-
Cant by the operation of the automobile, injured the plaintiff in the pres-
ent action. Plaintiff recovered a default judgment against DeCant and
filed a supplemental petition against the insurer. The Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the insured was liable within the terms of the policy.
The definition of hazards covered by the policy included "the ownership
maintenance or use of the premise for the purpose of an automobile
dealer ...and all operations necessary or incidental thereto; and the
ownership maintenance or use of any automobile in connection with the
above defined operations." The clause contemplated many "incidental"
activities not performable on the insured's premises. Nor does the defini-
tion necessarily exclude an automobile tided to someone else. The finance
company had placed the car with the insured for resale which gave him
authority to permit its use by others in connection therewith. The "reality
of the situation" makes it necessary to conclude that the handling of the
car for the finance company was "incidental" to insured's operation of his
dealership and thus within the definition of hazards. "Insured," as de-
fined by the policy, included anyone using the car with the permission of
the named insured, into which definition the use by DeCant fits. "Until
such time as a certificate of title is issued to a purchaser, no tide to the
automobile passes to him."
Innis v. McDonal4 involved a policy by which the insured was com-
mitted to repay the insurer all sums for which the latter became obligated
because of injury to or destruction of property arising out of operations
incident to a painting business, but exluded "property in the care, custody
or control" of the insured. Insured contracted to paint the outside of
,the dwelling house of the plaintiff and was to "have free access" to the
property until the work was completed. During the progress of the work
plaintiff continued to reside in the house just as he did before and after.
In scraping and burning off the old paint preparatory to repainting, the
insured damaged the siding and window frame of the house. Plaintiff
claims that he, as the resident of the house, was completely in "care, cus-
tody and control" thereof while the work was progressing and hence, that
the insurer is liable for the injury involved. The insurer counters with
the contention that the insured had "care, custody or control" of that
3. Id. at 415, 149 N.E.2d at 169. Compare, Workman v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co.,
144 Ohio St. 37, 56 N.E.2d 190 (1944) and Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St.
539, 113 N.E.2d 92 (1953).
4. 150 N.E.2d 441 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
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portion of the house on which he was working and which he damaged
in the course of such work and that the language was 'intended to ex-
dude the risk of attendant on the results of and the quality of the in-
sured's workmanship" that is, the policy "does not cover a situation where
the insured is doing the work called for in his contract at the place or
places where such work is to be performed and damage results from the
manner in which he does the work." Is there a distinction between
"care, custody or control" of the house as an entity, and of that portion
on which the insured was to perform work? The court concluded that
the entire house was in the "care, custody or control" of the resident, or
that, at least, the policy did not dearly exclude the portion on which
the insured was working, under the principle that an insurance policy is,
in case of ambiguity, to be construed against the insurer. The court of
appeals adopted the opinion which had been written in the court of
common pleas.5
Knowledge of Agent Imputed to Insurance Company
In Pannunzio v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.6 the agent of the insurer
who solicited life insurance learned that the insured had a heart disease
and in filling out the application, which was not read by the applicant,
failed to report this information to the insurer. In defending an action
by the .beneficiary on the policy, the insurer relied not on the falsity in
the application but on the provision of the policy which provided that
if the insured had been treated for a disease, within two years prior
to the issuance of the policy, the insurer could void the contract. The
court held that knowledge of the physical condition of the insured which
is known to an agent who is authorized to solicit and fil-in application,
to deliver policies and to collect premiums, is imputable to the insurer in
the absence of fraud or collusion on the part of the insured. Since the in-
surer, thus, in law, had knowledge of the physical condition, it is estopped
to rely on such conditions to avoid the policy.
Failure on Part of Insured to Answer Ambiguous Question
Held Not To Void Policy
In Pioneer Mutual Casualty Co. of Ohio v. Quails7 the plaintiff -in-
surance company sought to cancel an automobile liability policy because
of a breach of warranty in a false answer in the application which was
included in the policy. The application contained the standard question,
5. Innis v. McDonald, 150 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
6. 168 Ohio St. 95, 151 N.E.2d 545 (1958).
7. 104 Ohio App. 15, 146 N.E.2d 612 (1957).
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"Has automobile insurance ever been declined, cancelled or has renewal
been refused?" to which the insured answered negatively. The insured
personally had never been declined insurance but his son, who is included
in the present policy, had been excluded from coverage in a policy for-
merly issued by another company. The court stated the principle that
where there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract, the contract will be
construed most favorably to the insured, and found that "it certainly is
not clear whether the son's exclusion from coverage in a former policy
is embraced in this question." Consequently, the court concluded that the
refusal to include a member of the insured's family in a policy upon re-
newal does not constitute a declination, cancellation or refusal of renewal
of the policy within the meaning of the policy under consideration. The
question being properly answered, there was no fraud and no breach of
contract.
Payment of Premiums to Unauthorized Agent -
Estoppel Applied
A policy of life insurance in Scott v. Continental Assurance Co.'
provided that premiums were to be paid to insurer either at its home
office or to a duly authorized agent. However, for fourteen years the
insured had made payment of the premiums to the soliciting agent from
whom he had bought the policy who had no authority to receive premi-
ums other than the first. During this time the premiums had been trans-
mitted to the insurer and accepted by them. The agent persuaded the
insured also to pay him a sum of money which, it was said, would be
transmitted to the insured for a premium deposit fund which would pro-
tect the insurer in case of non-payment of regular premiums. This sum
was retained by the agent and it is for this that the insured seeks to re-
cover from the insurer. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that he should
be allowed to recover. The court relied on the acceptance of premiums
which had been transmitted through the agent over the long period of
time, and the fact that the agent, at the time the premium deposit
payment was made used forms - "spurious or genuine" - purportedly
issued by the company and purportedly bearing the signature of a home
office official.
It is difficult to understand how such forms, if spurious, could be
regarded as binding the insured. Three judges of the court, in a dissent-
ing opinion, while recognizing that an estoppel against the insurer had
been created as to premium payments, said, "The separate and -independ-
ent plan of establishing the premium deposit fund is something else.
8. 167 Ohio St. 515, 150 N.E.2d 38 (1958).
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That plan was conceived solely by [the agent], the insurer knew nothing
about it and had no good reason to, and it was on a basis not sanctioned
by the insurer in the policies or otherwise." It was "a complete fake" and
"was suspicious enough to have placed [the insured] on guard" and in-
duced him to make some inquiry.'0
Failure To File Timely Suit
In Metz v. The Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co." insured had a fire and
extended coverage policy which provided that no action should be brought
on the policy unless commenced within one year. Following an allegedly
covered loss insured did not inform the insurer of the loss until fifteen
months after it occurred and did not file suit until nineteen months
after the loss. Upon being informed of the loss, the insurer conducted
an investigation and made an offer of settlement which offer was refused.
It was following this refusal that suit was filed. Insured claims that this
conduct of the insurer amounted to a waiver. Does the fact that the
daim of waiver arose after the time limitation for bringing the action
had expired prevent the waiver from being asserted? The court held that
to constitute a waiver the act or declaration relied upon must be done
or made during the running of the period of limitation or at least begun
during that period. The court also eliminated the possibility of an
estoppel because there was no action by the insurer in connection with
the investigation or offer of settlement which was detrimental to the in-
sured.
Action for Reformation - Mistake in Insuring Surety
Instead of Purchaser of Automobile
Guenther v. Downtown Mercury, Inc.,'2 concerned an attempt to re-
form three companion documents arising out of the sale of an automobile:
the contract of sale, a chattel mortgage and insurance policy on the life
of the purchaser-mortgagor. The seller refused to agree to the purchase
of the automobile by a son and required some type of financial guarantee
by his father. Documents were signed which obligated the father and
the son to buy the automobile jointly and obligated them jointly on the
mortgage. The insurance application was signed to request insurance on
the life of the father and insurance was issued on his life. After the
9. Id. at 520, 150 N.E.2d at 41.
10. See: 9 WEsT. REs. L. R v. 337 (1958).
11. 104 Ohio App. 93, 147 N.E.2d 119 (1957).
12. 105 Ohio App. 125, 151 N.E.2d 749 (1958). See also CORPORATIoNs sec-
tion, supra.
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death of the son, the father, claiming that such was the intention of all
parties, sought to have the documents reformed to show purchase of the
automobile by the son, obligation by the father as surety only, and insur-
ance on the life of the son. The court of appeals held that the father
had failed to prove a mutual mistake by the conventional standard of
"clear and convincing" evidence. The court added that even had this
standard of proof been maintained the insurance policy could not have
been sustained because the insurance company was not a party to the
mistake but an innocent third party. Although this insurance company
routinely insured automobile purchasers to whom credit was extended by
finance company here involved, it stood alone and had no knowledge as
to the transaction out of which the application arose.
A dissenting opinion in the case found that the mutual mistake was
satisfactorily proved. Furthermore, the dissenting opinion would have
allowed reformation against the insurance company on two grounds:
(1) the company had no interest in the personality of the purchaser but
would have automatically issued a policy to the purchaser whomever he
might be. (2) The finance company under the direction of which the
documents were prepared, was the agent of the insurance company which
gave the latter imputed knowledge.
Corporation's Payment of Premiums on Policy
Insuring Life of Key Employee
In Finney v. Hinkle,13 William E. Hinkle, son, as general manager
and treasurer of Hinkle & Co. took out "key-man" insurance on himself
with Chester R. Hinkle, father, president of the company, as beneficiary.
The right to change the beneficiary was not reserved. William paid the
first premium. Subsequently, an agreement was entered into between
Chester and the company whereby, in consideration of payment of the
premiums by the company, Chester agreed that he would "endorse and
pay over unto" the company "any proceeds or benefits that he may
receive or have the right to receive." Upon William's death the receiver
for the company sued the insurance company and Chester for the pro-
ceeds of the policy. The insurance company paid the proceeds into
court and was discharged. The court said there was sufficient considera-
tion for the agreement and that it was not void as an attempt to change
the beneficiary contrary to the terms of the policy. It was an attempt
to -impress a trust on the funds for the benefit of the receiver. The court
held that a trust had been so impressed.
13. 106 Ohio App. 89, 153 N.E.2d 699 (1958).
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